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RESPONSIBLE COOPERATION IN FOREIGN POLICY

- BIPARTISANSHIP REDEFINED -

On February 20th President Eisenhower spoke over the airways
on the Middle Eastern situation. Earlier that same day the President had
met at the White House with Congressional leaders of both parties. As a
matter of fact the suggestion that he speak to the nation had come from
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia during the meeting .
The President's speech was addressed primarily to the

qu~stion

of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the
p rocess, however , be set forth in clear terms the problems facing us in
the Middle East. It was abo possible to discern in his remarks for the
first time the dim outlines of the Administration's policy for meeting
these problems .
A few days later, Secretary of State Dulles requested that

Con~

greseional leaders confer with him at hie home on the Middle Ea&tern
situation.

The conference was held on the eve of a major session of the

United Nations General Assembly where a move to impose sanctions on
I s rael was anticipated.
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Both of these meetings were bailed in the press as examples
of effective bipartisanship which in fact they were.

They were followed

by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of
Aqaba, an objective of the Administration's policy.

This withdrawal,

however, was accomplished without United Nations sanctions being
imposed, a course to which Congressional sentiment was clearly opposed.

It is imposei?le to uace the precise impact of the two meetings
on the subsequent events . That they had considerable influence , however,
seems clear .

What the meetings served to do was to clarify the situation

in the Middle East for Congressional leaders. This was done, moreover,

-

before not after an irrevocable course had been set by the Administl'ation.
Hence the possibility of partisan reaction in Congress was reduced .
Conversely, the meetings clarified for the President and the
Secretary of State the dimensions of acceptable policy in dealing with the
immediate crisis in the Middle East.

By assembling tbe Onngressional

leaders, the President and the Secretary of State had availed themselves
of the advice of a group of men not only attuned to attitudes in both
parties but also to popular sentiment in various regions of the country.
Take, for example, the geographic origins of the Democratic
leaders who attended the February ZOth meeting with the Pl,".csident.

The

Democratic Party in Congress is sometimes thought of as the special
preserve of the South or even more specifically of the State of Texas .
This is a tribute to the majority lea<Wr of the Senate , Lyndon Johnson
and to Sam. Rayburn, the Speaker of the House. Both men were in fact
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in attendance at the White House meeting and the South was also represented in the person of Senator Russell ,

But Senator Theodore F . Green

of Rhode Island was also presont as waa Senator William Fulbright of
Arka.nsa.s and myself, as \l;'hip , from Montana.

Frorn the House came

majority leader John McCormack of Na.ssachusetts and the Whip , Car l
Albert of Oklahoma and Congressman Tom Gordon of Ulinois , ae well
as Speaker Rayburn .
When the Republicans in attendance are added to this group,
a picture of geographic representation at the meeting w ith the President

emerges which covers ever y sector of the nation. It also embraces
virtually all shades of opinion in both parties in Congress .
Policy made by the President and the Secretary of State
against a background of this kind is almost certain to carry a greater
measure of public and Congressional support than policy made without
it.

The policy may not be as sensational in its impact abroad as a

dramatic unUateral action by the President, reinforced by the flarn boyant tce \Jnlquee of modern pv.Wlic relations.

It 1s likely to be,

however . a more profound , more reasaurina and enduring policy.
That in esaence ie the most that can be expected of bipartisanship.

If

it gives to foreign policy the deep and etable roots of wide public and
party acceptance , bipartisanship ha.s given a great deal.
Unfor tunately, this vital function of bipartisanship bas been
obscured by misuse of the word in recent y are .

Bipartisanship has been
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invoked repeatedly as though it were some kind of litany which if repeated
often enough :vould insure popularity for unpopular policies . It has often
been wielded as a club to silence responsible criticism of foreign policy.
It luls been applied as a catalyst in efforts by the Executive Branch to
urge measures of foreign policy through Congreae.

Misuse of bipartisan-

ship in these ways often tends in tin.t.e to stimulate precisely the opposite
reactions.
Bipartisanship is not a magical formula capable ol. producing
national unanimity where there are deep divisions. Nor is it a convenient
cloak under which to conceal these divbiono from foreign eyes •
.Americans differ on foreign issues no lose than on domestic
issues . Bipartieanship cannot

ex~cise

these differences . Properly

understood and used, however. it can help to minimize them.. It can
act to produce the widest possible area of accommodation among sectional
and party viewpoints in support of essential action abroad.
The need for that accommodation ls very great in a world
which bas closed in rapidly on the nation during the past two decades .
With the jete and mltasUeo overhead and the echoes of nuclear bomb
testa in v~!oue part& of the world. we have little chr;ice as a nation but
to stand together in foreign policy if we are to stand at all . If the warning of the weapons of mass destruction is lost

Oft

us. a defense budget

of about $40 billion a year and foreign aid of over $50 billion in the past

~
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decade should servo to remind uo that we are deeply involved in a
highly volatile world. We will either play our part n.e carefully and

as unitedly as we can or there may be no world left in which to play.
In domestic affairs, .leadership from the majority party and

a "responsible opposition" !rom the minority is normally sufficient to
keep the country on a reasonably level keel . In foreign affairs, however ,
this political mechanil!ltn is no longel' sufficient for effective national

action. It is not enough that foreign policy be led by the majority and
opposed by tho minority, even i£ the opposition is responsible .

The

problems which confront us in our relatione with other nations a!'e too
immense for thie formula. Whenever there is partisan division on
foreign problems as there was in the case of China policy several years
ago the country suffers thereby even though one of the parties may gain
a temporary advantage .
The fact ie that foreign relatione are of transcendent im·
portan..ce to all of us , to democrats and republicans alike and ought to

be treated a• such. If they are to be conducted in a fashion which safe·
guards the nation we must have more than majority lead,erehip and
minority opposition. We must have the great/est possible common
support for such action, from both paJ11ee and from all seetioJls of the
country.
The formula for invoking this type of aupport is not bo be
found in leadership by one party coupled with opposition from the other.

- 6 Rather it lies in a positive approach, in an approach of responsible
cooperation. This involves not only bipa.rtioenship. but what might be
termed tripartisanship . What is needed is activo cooperation between
both parties and also active cooperation between tho Executive Branch
and the Congress, notably the Senate , to construct and maintain a
more effective for eign polic y . The need for the latter type of coopera ..

tion 1e geneJ"aUy overlooked . Not infrequently, however , differences
between the two branches of the govornm.ent &l"e a more

si~icant

!actor than differences between the two parties in Congress.
As in bipaniaanship, the President must be the key

fi~re

in the development of uipartisanship . He must oupply the leadership
and he must be prepared to assume ultimate responsibility for foreign
relations .
The President's decisive position

derive~

in part from the

fact that he ie the only elected figqre in the govel"nrnent with what is ,
in effect, a national constituency. Hence, he alone can spea'i: as the
:repreaentative of the entire Amol'ican people .
The Preaident•s key poeition also stems from his b:nplied
ConaUtutional powers to conduct the foreign :relations of the United
States. I s t ress the word "implied", !or the erroneous impre3sion
has long existed that the President's power to conduct foreign relations
is explicit and total in the Constitution.
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Finally, the President's l<cy position in tdpartisanship

reotQ on the fact that he wields the Executive power of the nation. He

alone ha.s the resources in personnel and information necessary to the
conduct of our relations with other nations. Congress does not have
access to the innumerable sources of intelligence required iu the
formation. of day-to-day policies . Congress has neither Ambassadors
nor other agents

over~eas

essential to tho carrying out of policy.

Finally, Conaress cannot cow..mand the armed forces in support of
tho.t policy should it become necessary.
Notwithstanding the key role of the President, Congress and

especially the Senate abo have

i~ortant

functions in foreian policy.

Io the first place Senators and Representatives are individually
responsible to the peoples of their respective states and districts .
Taken as a whole each House has a na.tioual constituency. These
overlap each other and the President•o . Collectively, Congressional
responsibilities to

me people of the

United States, in foreign policy as

in other matters, parallel thnt of the President. These reeponsibilitie.a,
however , must be exorcised in accordance Within Constitv.tional powers.
Congress cannot l'epla.ee the President in the c:onduc;t of foreign relations
without fundamental changes in our Constitution . By the ea.m.e token,
however, the President cannot do without Congress in tha conduct oL
these relations.

The most important of the Congressional powers related to
foreign affairs of course are those of legislation and especially the
appropriation of public funds.

Congress provides for the Defense

establishment. Congress provides for the Department of State and other
agencies concerned with overseas relations. Congress authorities and
appropriate• money for foTeign aid. Congress declares war and makes
peace.

Tbe Senate, in addition to its joint powers with the House
also has cel'tain unique function in foreign relations. Two of the sc are
explicit in the Constitution. The Senate confirms the appointment of
Ambaseadol'B and other Presidential agents and it consents to the ratification of treaties, the basic instruments of foroign l'elations.

To the Senate also falls an implied Constitutional power of
vast imp orta.nce • Thie power, not unlike the Pre aident• a implied
authority to conduct foreign rtdatione, is the obligation to "advise and
consent" in foreign relations.
For long

p~riods

of time, the Senate's functions in this connec-

tion have lain dormant. In recent years, however , the power to advise
and consent has been invoked repeatedly and often most vigorously.
Sometimes it has operated before policy was established by the
President and has served to stimulate its formation. That was the case

in the Vandenberg Resolution adopted in 1948. Tho Resolution pt'omptoci
the President to enter into negotiations with the Western European nations

- 9 ..
with a viow to esta.bliahing common defense arrangem.enta. Out of this
Con.grcssional ;.nitiative; eventually came the North Atlantic Treaty
Organl7.ution and the elaborate NATO defense structure.
The advice and consent function can also come into play a.s a
corrective when the Executive Branch embarke impetuously on a
major course of international action.

'!'his use of the Senat e's power

is illustrated by the treatment of the recent Middle East resolution.

In that instance. the President needed and sought Congressional cooperation but he neglected to consult adequately and in advance with the
appropriate Congressional le<:.dere. The manner in which his proposal
was presented suggested that it had been drawn up hnstlly and without

careful consideration of its many implications. Moreover, the whip of

a. distorted bipartisanship was wielded and a sense of urgency was
engendered which subsequent hearings clearly revealed to bt) unwarranted.
Congress refused to be :Gtalnpeded by this misuse of bipartisanship. The Senate gave th& mcaaul"e the most careful consideration and
made numerous chelnges. In the end it adopted a revised and strengthened
resolution by a heavy and a. non-pa.rtisa.n majority.
If the relationship between the Executive and Legislative

branches of the government is one leg on which

tripa:rti~anship

rests,

the others 4l.re prov.ided by the two political parties . EaCh must be willing
to place national interest above party advantage and to cooperate

:responsibly with the other and with the President in the :formation and
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~

support o! fo:-eign !>Olicy. Responsible cooperation does ';lOt ioply
iropo!lec!

agr~ement

on 1nembers of either party when conscience compels

disag:J:eement. It does require , however , an extra measure of restraint
in dealing with question. a of foreign policy. It does require that both
partins seek to construct rather than obstruct .
The need for responsible cooperation from the parties is
especially acute when as at p:ree;ent one is in control of the Executive
Branch and the other is a majority in the Congress . In these circumstances, the President must avoid at all cocts seeking advantage for

his party on foreign policy mcav.ures. I! for no

oth~r

rea.s-!)n, he is

dependent upon the party in control of Congress for legislative leadership in dealing with these measures . If his actionc

augg~st

partisanship

they will inevitably beget parti9anship .
Similarly. the majority party in Congress cannQt adopt a pa.t:tisan attitude on foreign relations without endansering the wellbeing of

the nation. ln the long run. a non-partisan

c.ours~

for

tl.1~

majority

party or any party is one o! enlightened self-interest . There is no
last ing political advantage to be gained £ron:.t. placing party concern
ahova the nation' s intereets .

The people vi the nation are capable of

assessing responsibility in elect ions !or politically-motivated a<;tions
which daxr..age tho6e int erests.
The restraints which apply t1:> the majo1•ity party apply with
equal or greater force to the minority party in Congress. It cannot seek
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J:efugc in its minority status and leave to the majority the sometimes
difficult taal. of :follo·wing the President's leadership in foreign policy.
It cannot make political capital out of foreign policy, least of all when
"t is in control o! th~ Executive Branch.

The need for responsible cooperation, for "tripartiaanship''
in foreign policy ie widely recognized both in th... Executive Branch and
in the Congress .

There is every :reason to believe that the President

deeires lt. The majority and minority leaders of both Houaes of Congreee
have Tepeatcdly spoken and acted in a fashion well calculated to produce

it.
1ihat i:3 lacY-..ing , however , c.re generally accepted procedures for
bringing about such a policy en a continuing baais . The need ia most
acute a.t two points in the foreign policy process, in the formulation of
policy within the Executive Drancb and in its consideration prior to
adoption as a national cou:r se of action .
'rhe need in connection with formulation of policy

c~uld

be met

in part if a principal assistant to the Secretary ot State were always tl) be
designated from the opposite party whenever the latter was in control of
the Souate. Thie appointment could be aupplemented by the addition o!
other n1embers o£ the opposite party of proven

co~etenco

in foreign

relations to policy-making positions in the Department of State in roqh
proportion to the relative strengths o£ the two parties in the Senate.

- lZ The idea is no! wholly a new one. Both President Roosevelt
and President Truman followed it in part at various time a.

Recently

President Eisenhower appointed the former chairman of the Senate
Foreign Rclationtl Committee, Senator Walter F, George and James P.
Richards, the former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
to poate in the Department of State .

What is suggested here, however,

is that this informal practice be established on a quasi-formal and
continuing basis .
Responsible cooperation is also needed before major courses
of foreign policy are set. As noted, the procedure of triparti13an consultation for tliis pur?ose exists and haa been used twice in recent
weelte .
Again, l'.fhat is lacking is not solely procedure but its
acceptance and use as a regular instrumentality in the foreign policy
proc~ss.

Until now, th;} practice of advance Exe,cutivc-legtslative

coneulta.tion has been a haphazard one. There ie no particular pattern .

Presidents and their Secretaries of 'State have consulted at times with
leaders of their own party. the opposition party or both parties.
Sometimea they have chosen not to conS>u.lt at all.
If there is to be effective cooperation in foreign policy, there

is a need to formalize the procedw:.e of
early dayn of the Republic it was

fuBv

txipa.:~tiean

consultation.

I~ the
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connection have l.e.lu dormant. In recon' ttmos,
advise and consent bas be n
o~tim
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1uvok<.s~1

ru~d
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nat '• funetl ne in tbia

hoWQv~r.
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repeatedly o.nd oft n most vigorously.

e lt bna operated b for policy was atalJliah 4 by th Pr sideat

sczove to stimulate ita formation. Tht\t wa.a tho case with the
- whiCh v d th
for adhcr c to tb Ua:ait 4 Nattoo FWbz-1ght a aolutlon in 194 nd the Vand.onh r R sol\ltion ln 1946.
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r over muaeost cl thttt

it had been taawn up haetUy tmd Viitlmut c reful <:Cllaidtrrattcn of ita n1u.ny

im llcation . ltl th end th cocnato r viocd m

a-
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atrength ll"d th
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nrtisau majoJ"ity.

from the For lgn Relation•
of Miesourl a• Secretary

~on,mitte
~

~·,~~_D

a

...cJocratic

well • S nator Tom Henning•
Party and myaet£, aa 'Whip, from

ontana. From the Houle came majority leader John McCormack of
Maasachueette, the Whip. Carl Albert of Oklahoma, the Chairman of tha
Forei&n Affair& Committoe, Tom Gol'don of lllino •· and Spoakor Rayburll.
When tho Republic&nl in attendance ar added to thia a ·r oup, a
picture of aeoarapblc repretentation emerao• which covert every tector of
lt leo embraces virtually all abades of opinion in both partiea

the nation.

in Conarcae.
Polley made by the Pretident and tho Secretary o£ State against
a background o! lhle kind it alrnoat certain to c rry

areater measure of

public and Congreeeional tupport than policy made without h. It 1e likely
to be, moreovcn,., more reaatul'ing to !rlendly nationo abroad.
If tho relationthlp between tho Executive and Lcaialative brancbea

of the government la on tog on whlcb tripartltan•hip .r at8, tho othcn·e a.ro
provided by the two political partlea.

Th neo4 for roaponeible cooperation

from the partlet is eepeciaUy aeute when at at present one is in control of

e Exccutiv Branch and the other il a majority in the Congrees. In thoee
circumttane

1,

the Preeidont muat avoid tall costs eeeking advantaae for

hie party on for elan policy meaeurea. U for no oth r rca ton. be it dependent

.. n ..
upon the party in control of Congreea fo~ leaialative leadertblp.
S1milarly, the majority party in Consre•• cannot adopt a partiean
attitude on foreign relation• without endanaoring the wellbeina of the nation.
In the long run. a non·pa.rtil&n courae it the courae of enliahtened 1elf-intereet
!or any party.
party

advantaa~

There ia no laatina political return to be galrlecl trom placina
above the nation'• interotte.

Sooner or-later, the people of

the nadon will ataeas reapontibility in election• lor politically-motivated
action• which damaae tb.,.e interet it.

Tho reetrainte which apply to tho majority party apply with equal
or greater force to the minority party in Conarees.

lt cannot eeek refuae in

ita minol'ity et&tul and leave to the majority the eometimee difficult taek of

followina the Preeident't leacler1hip in foreian policy.

It cannot make political

capital out o£ fore!an rolicy, leaet o1 all when it ie in control o£ the Executive

Branch.
The need tor re•pontib\e eooporation, for ' tripartitanehip" in
foreign polley ie wldoly recognized both in the Executive Bl"&ncb and in the
Congre• •·

What i l atilt lac kina, however. are aenerally accepted procedure•

!or brinaina about aueb a policy on a contlnuina baeia. The need ie moat
acute at two plintl, in the foreign policy proceet. in the formulation of policy
within the Executive Branch and in ite cona1deration prior to adoption a• a
national .::our•3 o! action

.. lZ •

The 110ed in conn ction with formulation of policy could be met
ln part if

prlnelp&l aeeiatant to the S cretary of Stat were to be deelanated

ae a matter of r plar pra:Uce from the
was in control of the Senate.

OtpO

eite party whenever thll latter

Thie appointment could be

euppcment~d

by tho

addition o! other membore of the opposite tarty to p>ti<:y-maldnJ position• in
the D partment o£ State.
The idea le not wholly a new one.

Both Preaident Rooaevelt and

Pr eid nt Truman followed it in part at varioue times. Recently Presid-nt

Eie nhower appointed the former cbabman of th Senate Foreian Relations
Committ e. S nator Walter F. Oeorae and Jamoa P.
chairman of the Houac
m nt o! State.

~

For~ign

1charda, the former

AffalTs Committ c, to post• in the Depart-

hat 1a IUJI<:Ited here, howov r. la that thla informal

practice be oetabli8hed on a quaei-formal and continuing baele.
Rca(.Onaible COOJ»r&tion ia abo needQd before maJor eoux-aet o!
lor ian poUcy are •~-t. As noted, contuhation l.or thia purpoae haa been
uaed from dmo to time. Aaain, what b lacklna ia not a procedur but :lt.e
acceptance and uae aa a l'eialar inatrumentaUty in the foreian pollcy procoea.
Until now, the practice o!
a baph&£ard ono.

a.dvan~e

Tber ta no particular pattern. Pre1ldent1 and their

Secretariee d. State hav

conaultoc1 at times wlth leaders ot th4:ir own party.

with th oppoeltion party or

to contuh at all.

cxecutive-legtelatlvc con•ultation bat been

ith both parties. Sometime• th y have cboeen not

•
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n·• i• to be ef!ectlve cooperation in loroian policy- there l• a aeed

epublie it wa• fully

~cte4

enate in tbe conduct

or !oreip re\at on•.

that tho

l'ee14ent wocld. 1eek tile a4vlce or libe
Thi• :&alent coaetltutioaal coacept

ellou\4 be revivttd anAl ad.juetea to the l'eaUtie• o£ tbe pr••••t day.
It it of eolJrle impo11ible for the Prencleat to CODI'IIlt with dt.e
nth'e eute. I IUJI•It• however. bat •• a r•a,dar ancl coatbau Jll practice

the Pretid llt mlpt meet with the majority

ua minority leade:r1 of th• S~t•

a• we\1 &I tlle chairman o! the Committee on

minority member prior

to embar~

on any

orei&a llelatlOD.I and ltl rank
~r~ajol'

na

c:olUia of foreian pollcy.

The compraral»ca member• ol til Hou•e ol a prele.ntativea 1houl• 1M illcla4e4

involve action by the entire Conar•••.
However, a4equta. proce41\ll'al d.evlc"• are not a •u'betiwte for dt.e

will

to

cooperate in aa!eauarcltna the illtereata of the JMOplo of the Uatte4 State•.

cannot
Proce4ur•• ~eplace tllo loaderthip ucl the ultimate reepootlbiUty

au4 _Usc reepontiblUty of ucl& uutmber of Coape11.

reduce the pa.rt1tan !actor.

or the Pre• cleat

hat dley caa 4o, however,

They ca.n. al•o moblliae the fulleat po1aible tt

,_.t

of

our reaourcea in lntelt1Jence ancl experi nee for meatiu.a the areataat o! O\H" A-.ti.ou1
probl ma. In abort, !or What i8 at b••t an amblauou• 1'1laUoa1h£p lmowa &I bi·
parti•an•hlp lbe1o procecture1 can llelp to procluce a tl'ip&J'tilanablp with a ccmcr t
nAiledyiDa ab'uctue. Unt••• we move ln Ude dlrectlon we Wtlll:aave to
faco tb• claaotic proepect that oc::h party a• well •• the Pre1ident and the Coqre11
may atrike out etr~ctly on lt• o-.m ta lore111l potlcy. Thla cour1e WO\Iht be aR in·
vtcatton to national ditatter.

